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Natural language text such as that found on the web or in newspapers can nowadays
be efficiently parsed, including building meaning representations or logical forms, with
somewhat usable accuracy, at speeds of hundreds or even thousands of sentences a
second. And Google is parsing everything we type at it. Nevertheless, we still don’t have
real question-answering (QA), so that we can ask a question such as ‘Is the president in
Washington today?’, have it mapped to an equivalent query, and get a precise answer.
Such an answer could in principle be based on a semantic net or knowledge graph of
eventualities, continually built and updated by semantic parsers reading the newspa-
pers. Instead, we are still presented with a bunch of snippets from pages whose words
and linkages may or may not answer our question when we ourselves do the reading.
The central problem in using parsers to answer questions from unrestricted text
like this is that the answer to our question is very likely to be there somewhere, but
that it is almost certainly in a form which is not the same as that suggested by the
form of our question. For example, the question ‘Is the president in Washington?’ is
in fact answered by the statement in today’s paper that ‘The president has arrived at the
White House’. However, understanding this requires inferences that ‘having arrived’
at a place at a time entails ‘being at’ that place at that time, that being at the White
House entails being in Washington, and so on. We ourselves draw all of these inferences
effortlessly when we read the latter sentence. However, the standard logical form for
our question is something like present (in washington president), while that of the text
is present (perfect (arrived whitehouse president))
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Of course, the commonsense knowledge that links the two statements can be hand-
engineered for specialized domains, in this case by the use of resources such as
named-entity linkers, ontologies, and gazeteers, and inference rules linking arriving
with being there. However, there is simply too much of it to hand-engineer the open
domain.
The chapter begins by briefly reviewing some early attempts to build such represen-
tations by hand. It then compares the two main alternative contemporary approaches
to the discovery of hidden meaning-representations for relation-denoting content
words. Section . then examines the extension of one of these approaches to the
discovery of latent episodic relations such as temporal sequence and causality between
such terms, and examines some extensions and limitations of the approach. A brief
concluding section considers some broader implications for the theory of meaning, and
its implications for practical tasks like question answering.
. Decompositional lexical semantics
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Linguists, starting with the Generative Semanticists of the late ’s, have tried for many
years to build a form-independent semantics. The following are various attempts to
specify the meaning of the sentence ‘Bugs kill plants’ in terms of semantically primitive
relations like causation and change (see Travis, this volume, for discussion):
() Montague (): ∀x[bug′x ⇒ ∃y[plants′(y) ∧ kill′y x]]
McCawley ():
[S CAUSE BUGS [S BECOME [S NOT [S ALIVE PLANTS]]]]
Dowty (): [CAUSE [DO BUGS ∅] [BECOME ¬[ALIVE PLANTS]]]
Talmy (): Bugs ARE-THE-AUTHOR-OF[plants RESULT-TO-die]
Van Valin (): [do’(bugs’,∅)] CAUSE [BECOME [dead′(plants′)]]
Goddard (): BUGS do something to PLANTS; because of this, something
happens to PLANTS at the same time; because of this, something happens to
PLANTS’ body; because of this, after this PLANTS are not living anymore.
Other related representations are graphical, such as that of Schank (), in which the
left–right arrow ←→ represents the subject dependency, while the double up-arrow
↑↑ represents the causal dependency of the plants’ death upon the ACT of the bugs
(cf. Langacker ):
() bugs ←→ do
↑↑
plants ←→ die
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. Decomposing temporality
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
In a similar vein, Reichenbach () identified three temporal entities underlying the
semantics of the tensed verb group. These were: S—the speech time, or the time of the
speech act itself; R—the reference time, or the time referred to; and E—the event time,
the time of the eventuality identified by the main verb.
These entities may all be temporally disjoint, or may coincide or overlap. For example,
in the case of the pluperfect in (a), S is the time of utterance, R is at the time before S
that we are talking about, and E is at a time before R:
() a. My luggage had arrived.
b. We leave at dawn.
c. He is driving to London.
In (b), on the other hand, R the reference time is in the future, after S, and R and E
coincide at dawn. In (c), S and R coincide.
Tense—past in (a), the futurate present in (b), and the simple present of the pro-
gressive in (c)—defines the relation between R and S as precedence in (a), succession
in (b) and as identity in (c).1
Reichenbach seems to have conceived of S, R, and E as undifferentiated monolithic
intervals and their relations as purely temporal. However, the relation between R and
E, which is defined by progressive and perfect Aspect, respectively marked in English
by the auxiliary verbs be and have, is not a purely temporal relation between intervals.
The effect of the progressive auxilliary be is rather to turn the event into a progressive
state. The identity of that state depends on the type of the event. Events are anatomized
by Moens and Steedman (), following Vendler (), as falling into four aspectual
types or Aktionsarten, as follows (see chapters by Mittwoch, Verkuyl, Thomason,
Ramchand, and Travis, in this volume):
() Name Type Example Grammatical test
Accomplishments +telic, +durative drive to London for an hour/in an
hour/at dawn
Achievements +telic, −durative arrive in London for an hour/in an
hour/at dawn
Activities −telic, +durative drive for an hour/in an
hour/at dawn
Points −telic, −durative start/stop driving for an hour/in an
hour/at dawn
1 More accurately, past tense defines the reference time as other than the situation of utterance, since
past tense is also a marker of counterfactual modality, as in its use in counterfactual conditionals (Isard
).
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The symbol ‘’ on a test such as combination of ‘drive to London’ with ‘at dawn’ means
that the combination is impossible without a change in the type of the event—in this
case, to something like ‘start to drive to London’. (It is important to remember this point,
because almost any of these combinations is possible with such ‘coercions’ to different
event types.)
The effect of simple past tense on these event types is simply to identify the entire
extent of the eventuality time E with the anterior reference time. For the telic accomp-
ishments and achievements, this entails that the goal of the event—in this case being in
London—was achieved.
() a. He drove to London.
b. He arrived in London.
c. He drove.
The effect of the progressive auxiliary is to turn the core eventuality into a progressive
state. The type of this state is determined by the above eventuality types, as in the
following examples:
() a. He was driving to London.
b. He was arriving in London.
c. He was driving.
The progressive of an activity (c) says that R is anterior to S and that the eventuality E
is a progressive state of him driving holding at a past R, where the start and stop points
of E are undefined.
The progressive of an accomplishment (a) is almost identical to (c). The progressive
state is his driving with the goal of being in London, and it holds at the anterior reference
time. However, it is not entailed that the goal was achieved: it is perfectly consistent to
continue ‘but the car broke down and he never got there’.
The progressive of an achievement (b) says that the progressive state holding at R
was not the arriving but an inferrable activity that would normally result in arrival, such
as his driving the last part of the route to London.
Thus the three examples in () have rather similar truth conditions. One might think
of this as the progressive auxiliary turning everything into the nearest related activity.
Often this is what Moens and Steedman called the preparatory activity, but it may also
be iteration of the core event, as in ‘I am seeing a doctor.’
Since most states do not have associated preparatory activities, and nor can they
iterate, they can only combine with the progressive by rather extreme coercions to
events. Thus the following seems to refer to repeatedly showing that you know the answer
whenever asked:
() I am knowing the answer (these days).
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The perfect auxiliary has a similar effect of mapping events onto states. The states in
question are what Moens and Steedman called the consequent state of the core event
(cf. Portner ).
() a. I have driven to London.
b. I have arrived in London.
c. I have driven.
Thus, the perfect of an accomplishment (a) and an achievement (b) are true just in case
the consequent state (in this case, my being in London) hold at the (present) reference
time. The perfect of an activity is only acceptable to the extent that the activity has an
accessible consequent state, such as my probably still remembering how to drive.2
Many questions about such representations were never satisfactorily resolved, such
as whether the representation should be ‘decompositional’, as in the above cases,
or ‘procedural’ (Woods ), or based instead on ‘meaning postulates’ or rules of
entailment (Fodor et al. ).
Nevertheless, all such formalisms have the attraction of being potentially language-
independent, together with the considerable advantage of being immediately
compatible with inference using first-order logical operators such as negation. Thus, one
could in principle deduce an answer to the question ‘Are the plants alive?’ from the text
‘The bugs killed the plants’, or the equivalent in another language, or use such meaning
representations to support machine translation. However, such semantics was confined
to small fragments, and remained somewhat language-specific (Dorr et al. ).
Related attempts at a decompositional semantics have been more recently realized
semi-automatically as computational lexical resources, including WordNet (Fellbaum
), FrameNet (Baker et al. ), VerbNet/PropBank (Hwang et al. ), BabelNet
(Navigli and Ponzetto ), Abstract Meaning Representations (AMR, Banarescu et al.
), and the relations over named entities of the Google Knowledge Graph (Singhal
).
However, such hand-built semantic resources are invariably incomplete, in the sense
that they leave out many relations, usually because such resources are built (consciously
or unconsciously) for human users, and omit many essential entailments that humans
find too obvious to ever need to state.
For example, at the time of writing, the FrameNet entry for the verb ‘arrive’ tells us a
great deal about the verb ‘arrive’, but omits the information that the consequent state or
result of the theme arriving at the goal is that the former is situated at the latter, which is
what the relation perfect′ in the logical form for the text in our running example needs
to access in order to know that the text does actually answer the question.3
2 Of course, in context, other coercions than those suggested here may be possible.
3 https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fnReports/data/frameIndex.xml?frame=Arriving (accessed 
August ).
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Of course, this paricular lacuna would be easy enough to fix, but there are many
more (such as that not being at the goal already is a precondition of arriving). It is hard
to believe that such resources will ever be complete enough to support our hypothetical
question-answerer.
. Decompositional primitives
as ‘hidden’
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
This realization prompts the following thought: why not let parsing and machine
learning do the work of completing the semantics instead, using the ‘machine reading’
approach of Etzioni et al. () and Mitchell et al. () to mine ‘hidden’ or latent
entailment relations such as that between arriving and being at a place?
There are two active approaches to this problem. The first treats the meaning of a
content word as a location in a high-dimensional vector space. The dimensions of this
space can initially be thought of as all the other content words of the language, with
distances along those dimensions corresponding to counts of the occurrences of those
words in the immediate neighbourhood of the word in question. However, this is a
space of such high dimensionality and such sparse occupancy that its dimensionality
must in practice be reduced. The reduction must be such as to preserve the Euclidean
property of the original space to some degree of tolerance. Closeness in the space then
represents relatedness in meaning (although relatedness tends to include antonymy as
well as synonymy).
The attraction of such representations is that one can accomplish the composition
of words into phrase- and sentence-level meanings using linear-algebraic operations
like vector addition and multiplication (Church and Hanks , Smolensky ,
Landauer and Dumais , Lin , Baroni and Zamparelli , Grefenstette and
Sadrzadeh , Padó and Lapata , Mikolov et al. , Bordes et al. , Mitchell
and Steedman , Guu et al. , Neelakantan et al. , Weir et al. , passim).
Vector-based ‘embeddings’ representing all the contexts a word has been encountered
in can be trained by unsupervised methods over vast amounts of text, and can be very
useful for disambiguating unseen words. In particular, when used as features to tune a
supervised parsing model, they can be very effective in deciding which seen events in
the supervised model most resemble unseen events in unseen text (Henderson ,
Henderson et al. , Chen and Manning , Lewis and Steedman a,c, Dyer
et al. , ).
However, for the same reason, it is questionable whether we can think of vec-
tors as meaning representations. In particular, it remains unclear how to make such
representations compatible with the logical operators such as negation, conjunction,
and disjunction that are crucial to tasks such as question-answering.
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.. Combined distributional and formal semantic
representations
An alternative approach, advocated by Moro and Navigli (), Navigli and Ponzetto
(), Nakashole et al. (), and Grycner and Weikum (), Grycner et al. ()
among others, shows that relational ontologies, including multilingual ones, can be built
by mining text concerning recognizable named entities.
Lewis and Steedman (a,b, b) and Lewis () propose to combine distri-
butional and formal semantics by mining text concerning typed named entities such
as the person named by Mr. Obama and the office named by President for consistent
directional entailments using so-called distant supervision (Mintz et al. ), making
strong assumptions concerning the entailment relations between predications that we
frequently see made about sets of entities of the same type. For example, if when we
read about a person being elected to an office, we often also read about them running
for that office (but not vice versa), we may hypothesize that the former entails the latter.
Typing is necessary, because distinct relations are sometimes homonymous, as with the
born in relation, which denotes distinct relations between people and places on the one
hand, and people and times on the other. Such candidate entailments will therefore
be probabilistic and noisy, and are inherently distributional (for example, the president
is sometimes a person and sometimes an office). But Lewis and Steedman (b)
follow Berant et al. () in exploiting the transitivity of entailment to make cleaner
entailment graphs out of the candidate entailments, using various techniques to refine
the entailment graph.4
For example, the typed named-entity technique is applied to (errorfully) estimate
local probabilities of entailments using an asymmetric similarity measure such as
Weeds precision (Weeds and Weir ), giving data that might look like the following
simplified example for pairs of people and things xy, where ⇒ means ‘probabilistically
entails’ (cf. Lewis and Steedman b):
() a. p(buy x y ⇒ acquire x y) = 0.9
b. p(acquire x y ⇒ own x y) = 0.8
c. p(acquisition (of x) (by y) ⇒ own x y) = 0.8
d. p(acquire x y ⇒ acquisition (of x) (by y)) = 0.7
e. p(acquisition (of x) (by y) ⇒ acquire x y) = 0.7
f. p(buy x y ⇒ own x y) = .
4 It is important in what follows to distinguish the entailment graph that is used to identify paraphrase
clusters and entailment relations from the knowedge graph, which represents all the knowledge in some
body of text such as the Web. Of course, some of the mentions of entities in the text will involve
pronominal and other forms of definite reference. However, pilot experiments with Reginald Long using
the Stanford coreference sieve suggest that, in newspaper text at least, such coreference is involved in
only around  of recoverable relations.
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g. p(buy x y ⇒ buyer (of x) y) = 0.7
h. p(buyer (of x) y ⇒ buy x y) = 0.7
i. p(inherit x y ⇒ own x y) = 0.7
(etc.)
These local entailment probabilities are used to construct an entailment graph shown
in Figure ., with the global constraint that entailment graphs must be closed under
transitivity (Berant et al. ).
Thus, (f) will be correctly included, despite low observed frequency, because it is
supported by the transitivity of entailment, while other low-frequency spurious local
entailments will be dropped.
‘Cliques’ within the entailment graphs—that is, groups of relations that all mutually
entail each other such as acquire, acquisition-of, and are therefore paraphases—can be
collapsed to a single cluster relation identifier, such as rel2 in Figure ..
On the basis of this graph of entailments, we can take the categorial lexicon
used by the parser to identify the original text-dependent local entailments, and
transform it into something better-adapted to question-answering, by replacing the
form-dependent Montague-style predicates by paraphrase cluster identifiers for their
meaning. For example, some lexical items related to the buying entailment graph in
Figure . will now look something like the following:
() own := (S\NP)/NP : λxλy.rel x y
inherit := (S\NP)/NP : λxλy.rel x y
acquire := (S\NP)/NP : λxλy.rel x y
buy := (S\NP)/NP : λxλy.rel x y
buyer := N/PPof : λxλy.rel x y
In order to answer a question such as ‘Did Verizon acquire Yahoo?’, which denotes
relation rel, we retrieve from the entailment graph all relations which either entail or
are entailed by rel. If we can derive either from raw text, or from some knowledge
graph representing the information in the text, rel or any of the relations entailing rel
own x y
acquire x y
acquisition (of x) (by y) 
buy x y
buyer (of x) y
inherit x y
rel1
rel2
rel3
rel4
figure . A simple entailment graph for property relations between people and things.
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(here, rel), we can answer the question affirmatively. If on the other hand we can derive
the negation of any of the entailments of rel (here, rel), then the answer is negative.
The clustered clique or paraphrase identifiers such as rel play much the same
role in the entailment-based semantics as semantic features such as alive did in the
decompositional theories of semantics in (), whereas the relations over such para-
phrase cluster identifiers in the entailment graph correspond to Carnapian/Fodorian
meaning postulates. Such logical forms immediately support correct inference under
negation, such as that bought in the text entails acquired and doesn’t own therefore
entails didn’t buy.
An example of open-domain questions succesfully answered from unseen text using
these techniques is shown below. (Following Poon and Domingos , the questions
were artificially generated by replacing arguments in parsed web text with a dummy
wh-question element ‘What’ to generate pseudo-wh-questions, which were then
answered on the basis of unseen text of the same genre. See Lewis and Steedman
a, Lewis  for further details and experiments.)
() Question Answer From unseen sentence:
What did Delta Northwest The  freighters came with Delta’s
merge with? acquisition of Northwest
What spoke with Obama Obama conveyed his respect for the
Hu Jintao? Dalai Lama to China’s president Hu
Jintao during their first meeting
What arrived in Zazi Zazi flew back to Colorado. . .
Colorado?
What ran for Young . . .Young was elected to Congress in
Congress? 
.. An application to machine translation
It should be apparent at this point that we can collect local entailments between
expressions in languages other than English, provided that we can recognize and type
the named entities in the language concerned, and align their types with the English
ones. Lewis and Steedman (b) report an extension of the paraphrase/entailment
semantics to French, and apply it to the task of reordering Moses (Koehn et al.
) phrase-based statistical machine translations from French sentences to English.
The bilingual semantics is evaluated by parsing the top  English translations into
language-independent meaning representations and reordering them according to how
well they preserve the multilingual entailment-based meaning obtained by parsing the
original French. Where this process prefers a translation that is different from Moses’
own top-ranked translation, bilingual judges are asked which they prefer. In  of
cases where there is a difference, the judges prefer the reranked alternative, compared
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to the  of cases in which they prefer the Moses -best. (Many of the remaining 
of cases in which there was no preference are ones in which the difference between the
candidates was a matter of a syntactic attachment which was not available to the judges
from mere presentation of the strings.)
An example of a successful reordering of Moses SMT translations is the following:
() Source: Le Princess Elizabeth arrive à Dunkerque
le  août 
SMT -best: The Princess Elizabeth is to manage to
Dunkirk on  August .
Reranked -best: The Princess Elizabeth arrives at Dunkirk
on  August .
See Lewis and Steedman (b) for detailed results and further experiments.
. Meaning representation for
eventualities
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
It is natural to ask what kinds of semantic information can be mined in this way.
This section considers a variety of open problems in the semantics of content words
concerning eventualities.
.. Temporality and causality
If the text that we are mining is datelined, as news material usually is, then we should be
able to work out that the entailments associated with people visting places in the graph in
Figure . are temporally (or rather, causally) ordered, and that being there is the result
of arriving, and therefore an entailment of having arrived, as in the example with which
this chapter began. Certain finer distinctions, such as that between the present and the
simple futurate, can be drawn on the basis of temporal modifiers, as in visits/is visiting
Hawai’i next week, whose automatic extraction has been investigated by Chambers et al.
(), using supervised learning over labelled resources such as TimeBank (UzZaman
et al. ).
We may also expect to find entailments stemming from inceptive and conclusive
aspectual ‘coercions’ involving light verbs like ‘start’, of the kind discussed by Moens
and Steedman (, ) and Pustejovsky (), such as progressive is visiting, and
compounds like start a visit, finish a vacation, and the like.
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1 2
4
5
3arrive–in x y
reach x y
depart–from x y
leave x y
stop–off–at x y
visit x y
vacation–in x y
holiday–in x y
have–arrived-in x y
be–visiting x y
be–in x y
figure . A temporal entailment graph for people visiting places.
These finer distinctions in varieties of entailment between relations can be discovered
automatically from data like the following concerning particular pairs of named entities,
from the University of Washington NewsSpike corpus (Zhang and Weld ), all of
which have the same dateline of  February .
() {"arg1":"OBAMA","arg2":"MINNEAPOLIS","sentences": [{"relation-
phrase":"be in","tokens":
["Obama","is","in","Minneapolis","to","push","for","tougher",
"gun","laws","and","highlight","some","of","the","things","the",
"city","has","done","to","try","and","reduce","gun","violence",
"as","Mayor","R.T.","Rybak","and","some","of","his",
"counterparts", "across","the","country","try","to","put",
"direct","pressure", "on","firearms","makers","."],
"a1":[0,1],"a2":[3,4],"v":[1,3],"fromArticleId":371037},
{"relationphrase":"head to","tokens":
["Obama","heads","to","Minneapolis","to","sell","gun","plan",
"."], "a1":[0,1],"a2":[3,4],"v":[1,3],"fromArticleId":369952},
{"relationphrase":"be visit","tokens":
["Monday",",","Obama","is","visiting","Minneapolis","to", "dis-
cuss","his","plan","to","battle","gun","violence","."],
"a1":[2,3],"a2":[5,6],"v":[3,5],"fromArticleId":433846}],. . .}
In such data, we find that statements that so-and-so is visiting, is in, and the perfect
has arrived in such and such a place, occur in stories with the same dateline, whereas is
arriving, is on her way to, occur in preceding stories, while has left, is on her way back
from, returned, etc. occur in later ones. We also use the TimeBase/TimeML supervised-
trained event and time-ordering system CAEVO to handle time-adverbials and order
events (Pustejovsky et al. a,b, Chambers et al. ).
This information provides a basis for inference that visiting entails being in, that the
latter is the consequence of arriving, and that arrival and departure coincide with the
beginning and end of the progressive state of visiting.
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In order to capture the semantics behind these intuitions, we follow Moens and
Steedman (), Hornstein (), Smith (), Steedman (), Portner (),
and Fernando () in assuming a neo-Reichenbachean semantics of tense, aspect,
and modality.
Our event calculus is instant- and state-based (Steedman , Kowalski and Sergot
, Copley and Harley , and Copley’s chapter in this volume), not interval-
or event-based as in Dowty (), Allen (), Bach (a)—cf. Galton ().
We could use it as the input to a neo-Reichenbachian semantics of temporality, via
(handbuilt) lexical entries for auxiliary verbs and other closed-class words (Steedman
, , , a, Webber , Moens and Steedman , White , Puste-
jovsky , Filip , Fernando , passim), where the prime on consequent-state′
etc. indicates that it is the identifier of a cluster of linguistic forms that are paraphrases:
() has := (S\NP)/VPpastpl
: λpEλy.consequent-state′ pE y R ∧ R = S
will := (S\NP)/VPb
: λpEλy.Pprior (pE y) ⇒ imminent-state′ pE y R ∧ R = S
must := (S\NP)/VPb
: λpEλy.Pposterior (pE y) ⇒ imminent-state′ pE y R ∧ R = S
is := (S\NP)/VPprespl
: λpEλy.progressive-state′ pE y R ∧ R = S
However, we have already noted the absence of a source where we can look up the
(possibly multiple) consequent states of relations like arriving somewhere, so logical
forms like the above are rather vacuous. It would be more straightforward to write them
simply as the paraphrase cluster identifiers have′, will′, must′, be′, etc., as follows, and
to let the entailment graph do the rest of the work—for example, the work of saying
that having arrived somewhere entails being there, and that the epistemic modal ‘will’ in
‘That will be the postman’ entails that the prior probability of the postman’s presence is
high, whereas epistemic ‘must’ in ‘That must be the postman’ entails that the posterior
probability based on some further evidence is high:
() has := (S\NP)/VPptpl
: λpEλy.have′ (pE y E) R ∧ E < R ∧ R = S
will := (S\NP)/VPb
: λpEλy.will′ (pE y E) R ∧ E > R ∧ R = S
must := (S\NP)/VPb
: λpEλy.must′ (pE y E) R ∧ E > R ∧ R = S
is := (S\NP)/VPprespl
: λpEλy.be′ (pE y E) R ∧ E ⊃ R ∧ R = S
(Like the first-order logical operators such as quantifiers and negation, the tense
operators relating S and R, and the further information in the modals can be hand-
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, //, SPi
form-independent meaning representation 
coded into the lexicon, either via the morphology or semi-automatically for unanalysed
verbs.)
By treating have arrived as a distinct relation, and a node in its own right in the
entailment graph, we will then be able to learn by our standard machine-reading process
that it entails being there at the reference time.
Similarly, the following are some potentially learnable lexical entries for implicative
verbs (Karttunen , ):
() try := (S\NP)/VPto : λpEλy.try′ (pE y) y E
manage := (S\NP)/VPto : λpEλy.manage′ (pE y) y E
fail := (S\NP)/VPtoλpEλy.fail′ (pE y) y E
stop := (S\NP)/VPingλpEλy.stop′ (pE y) y E
Let us assume that the entailment graph built using the procedure outlined earlier
includes the following, in which ‘’ denotes directional entailment in the graph:5
() a. win′person,game  play′person,game
b. ¬win′person,game  play′person,game
c. fail′person,event  ¬event ∧ try′person,event
d. ¬fail′person,event  event ∧ try′person,event
e. stop′person,event  event
f. ¬stop′person,event  event
etc.
(That is, our machine reading can be expected to detect latent ‘presuppositional’
relations between both winning and not winning and playing on the one hand, and
failing/not failing and trying on the other.)
In the latter case, learning that failing to do something entails not doing it relies on
the assumption that the text will elsewhere include explicit negation of the outcome.
This assumption seems reasonable, since trying to do something creates an a priori
likelihood of doing it, which is a precondition for the felicitous use of negation
(Freud ).
.. Presupposition as entailment
The above subsumption of presupposition to entailment is akin to Wilson’s ()
account of logical presupposition in terms of entailment. However, a number of
criticisms of this assumption have been raised, whose relevance to the present purpose
is briefly reviewed below.
5 Negation ¬ here is clearly nonclassical as in intuitionistic or relevance logics (Fitting , Anderson
and Belnap ).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, //, SPi
 mark steedman
The entailment account is at first glance also broadly consistent with Karttunen’s
account of the behaviour of presupposition under various kinds of embedding pred-
icate. Karttunen divided such predicates into three categories, called ‘plugs’, ‘holes’, and
‘filters’, according to whether they blocked all presuppositions from emerging from
an intensional context, or allowed all of them to so emerge, or blocked only some
presuppositions. The ‘plugs’ constituted a large class of propositional attitude verbs
such as ‘say’, and were so called because, while the following seems to entail that Frank
believes Mary used to smoke, it doesn’t seem to commit the speaker to that belief:
() Frank said that Mary had stopped smoking.
The ‘holes’ were a narrower, ‘factive’, class of propositional attitude verbs, such as know,
which did commit the speaker to any presuppositions of the complement. Thus, either
of the following seems to commit the speaker to the belief that Mary used to smoke:
() a. Frank knows that Mary has stopped smoking.
b. Frank doesn’t know that Mary has stopped smoking.
It seems reasonable to assume that factivity can also be captured by the same process of
mining text for coincidences across multiple predications over multiple sets of entities
of the same type.
The ‘filters’ were the natural language equivalent of logical connectives, such as ‘if. . .
then. . .’. Whereas in (a) the construction acts like a hole to the definite presupposition
of the consequent that John has children, in (b), where the antecedent includes that
same presupposition, it acts like a very strong plug, and the presupposition does not
emerge.
() a. If it is past eight o’clock, then John’s kids are asleep.
b. If John has kids, then John’s kids are asleep.
Similar considerations apply to disjunction and conjunction. Neither of the following
presupposes that John has chidren:
() a. (Either) John has no kids, or John’s kids are asleep.
b. (Both) John has kids, and John’s kids are asleep.
The behaviour of the filters should clearly be made to follow from the semantics of the
connectives themselves (Karttunen , Heim ). For example, the facts in ()
would follow if P ⇒ Q were equivalent to ¬P ∨ (P ∧ Q), rather than the standard
Philonean ¬P ∨ Q, as is the case for the semantics proposed in Steedman (b).
However, two further kinds of example have caused some people, including Wilson
herself, to question the simple identification of presupposition with entailment. The
first arises from the fact that a presupposition can be ‘accommodated’ or assented to by a
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hearer who didn’t know that it held before it was made, provided only that it is consistent
with everything that they do know. For example, if someone tells me to ‘fetch me the
envelope that is in the drawer’ under conditions where I have no prior knowledge of
such an envelope, then unless I already know that the drawer is empty, I will simply add
such a referent to my model of the situation, and proceed to plan the requested action
as if I’d known about the referent all along. Frequently, this will require updates to my
world knowledge, as for the following from van der Sandt (), for which I will prob-
ably have to add the knowledge that every scuba-diver has a regulator (whatever that is):
() If a scuba-diver comes, they will bring their regulator.
Clearly, in terms of the entailment account, so long as we allow the model to be dynamic
or ‘updateable’, this dynamism simply corresponds to modifying the model so that it is
consistent with the entailment asserted by the speaker. The only complication arises
when the prior state of knowledge of the hearer is not consistent with the speaker’s
entailment, when either the whole utterance must be rejected, or the prior knowledge
must be modified, in a process of ‘consistency maintenance’ or ‘belief revision’, accord-
ing to which the model of the common ground of the discourse is changed.
The second class of presuppositional effects that has caused people to question the
entailment account arises from the possibility of ‘cancelling’ or negating a presupposi-
tion, as in utterances like the following in response to a positive presupposition-carrying
assertion:
() a. Jane hasn’t stopped smoking, because Jane has never smoked!
b. The present King of France hasn’t died! There is no King of France.
c. It isn’t true that John knows Mary is angry, because Mary is not angry!
However, there is clearly something odd about these utterances that takes them beyond
the scope of sentential semantics. These utterances are clearly speech acts of contra-
diction involving more than one speaker, as when speaker A says ‘Mary is angry’ and
speaker B says ‘No she isn’t’. We would not want to say that B has thereby uttered an
inconsistency. The fact that the syntactic form of the first clause in () seems to assign
it a truth value. This is just the vagueness of everyday language concerning the difference
between truth/falsity and the speech acts of assertion/denial.
The failure to recognize the extra-semantic nature of accommodation and
presupposition-cancellation has engendered a certain amount of confusion in the
literature on presuppositions. For example, the following alternative to (b) does not
seem to /presuppose/ that John has children, but rather to assert it. This fact does not
follow from our explanation of presupposition projection from the conditional in terms
of non-Philonean implication, which would generate (b):
() a. If John’s kids are asleep, then John has kids.
b. ¬(asleep ∧ has) ∨ (asleep ∧ has) ∧ has
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Clearly, this utterance only makes sense if someone other than the speaker has said
‘John’s kids are asleep’—a property of such utterances that Fillmore () called
‘semiquotation’—and the speaker is affirming their accommodation of the other’s pre-
supposition.
.. An application
The most ambitious application of such a semantics would be to build a knowledge
graph or semantic network in which the nodes would be entities such as Barack Obama,
Sherlock Holmes, and Aluminium, and the arcs would be relations and eventualities
of the kind we have been looking at, mined from text. Such networks would be very
large, on the same order of magnitude as social networks such as Facebook, with
nodes numbering in the billions, calling for techniques like ‘spreading activation’ or the
modern equivalent to limit the complexity of querying and updating them (Harrington
and Clark ).
The advantage of building such semantic networks using the semantic represen-
tations proposed in this chapter would be that they could be queried in natural
language, via a semantic parser building form- and language-independent meaning
representations of the same kind as those in the semantic network itself, avoiding
the severe problems of representational impedance mismatch that make the problem
of natural language query of databases and knowledge graphs such as the Google
knowledge graph so difficult (Reddy et al. ).
Building knowledge graphs from natural language semantic parses remains a chal-
lenging problem which has not yet been solved. However, we might think of the process
of building and interrogating such a graph in terms of thought-experiments like the
following.
Suppose that, in the course of continually updating the knowledge graph, the seman-
tic parser encounters the following sentence in the text it is mining:
() Watford has failed to win the Cup.
The parser assigns the following Fodorian meaning representation, simplified as usual
for present purposes:
() have′ (fail′ (win′ cup′ watford′) watford′ E) R ∧ R = S
At this point, the program should inspect the entailment graph for this relation, and
prepare to add to the knowledge graph arcs corresponding to this relation and all its
entailments, namely the following:
() a. ¬win′ cup watford′ E ∧ E < R
b. try′ (win′ cup′ watford′) watford′ E ∧ E < R ∧ R = S
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c. play′ watford′ E ∧ E < R ∧ R = S
d. losers′ watford′ R ∧ R = S
If any of those relational arcs are already present in the graph—as when it has already
been read that Watford tried to win the cup—or if any of them are inconsistent—as when
it has already been read that Watford won the cup—then they all should not be added
just yet. On the other hand, if they are not there already, they should be added to the
nodes for the two entities involved.
For example, if it is already known that (c) Watford played at some time E in the
past, then only (a,b,d) need be added.
If on the other hand the graph says that Watford didn’t play then some process of
‘consistency maintenance’ must be entered, possibly via a dialogue with the source of the
new information, for which the inconsistency of playing and not playing suggests the
appropriate opening is ‘But Watford didn’t play’, followed by a discussion of the grounds
for the disagreement. (This process would be akin to what in the earlier discussion of
the presupposition literature was referred to as ‘cancelling’ the presupposition.)
If, on the other hand, the sentence to be used for knowledge-graph update is the
following, then the entailment graph () dictates that arcs be added corresponding
to not failing, winning, trying to win, playing, and being a winner, equivalent to the
utterance ‘Watford managed to win the cup’ (Karttunen , ):
() Watford didn’t fail to win the cup.
This underlines the importance of treating the meaning representations of has Xed,
didn’t X, and so on as nodes in the entailment graph in their own right, rather than
as formulæ involving logical negation and modality.
. Other varieties of entailment
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
More broadly, we expect to see type-based entailments involving (frozen) metaphors of
the kind discussed by Lakoff (a,b), such as that between a government attacking a
disease and it trying to prevent the disease. (This will simply be a differently typed sense
of the verb attack from the one involving pairs of individuals or countries.)
On the other hand we shall not expect to capture Gricean conversational implicature
the same way: if I ask for bread, and you tell me that there is a bakery around the corner,
I will infer that you think the bakery is open. But that is not a matter of entailment. We
do not expect to be able to detect such implicatures by the present method.
Similarly, we shall see entailments depending on type-based coercions of verbs like
start and finish to distinct inchoative and cuminative events for the characteristic
affordances of entities like sandwiches and novels (Pustejovsky and Bouillon ).
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We also expect to see entailments betwen verbs and their nominalizations. Thus, a
corpus that talks about Rome destroying Carthage may also include mentions of Rome’s
destruction of Carthage, Rome’s destroying Carthage and vice versa. These forms will
therefore be reduced to the same paraphrase cluster relation in their lexical logical
forms.
While gerundive transitive nominalizations like the latter Rome’s destroying Carthage
are completely productive, the derived nominals like Rome’s destruction of Carthage
are notoriously idiosyncratic. Thus we have John grows potatoes and gerundive John’s
growing potatoes, and derivational the growth of John’s potatoes, but not ∗John’s growth of
potatoes (Chomsky , Marantz ). While there seem to be semantic regularities
underlying the availability or otherwise of derivational nominals for transitives (Dowty
, Grimshaw , Levin and Rappaport Hovav ), they depend on the same
features of the semantics that we are treating as hidden, so it seems appropriate to
discover them piecemeal in this fashion.
We shall also expect to see that multi-word relations like write a book about have
detectable entailments like know about, whereas syntactically identical relations like
destroy a book about do not, and therefore do not end up with a distinct clustered
entailment semantics in their own right. This fact may explain the well-known but
otherwise puzzling sensitivity of the corresponding preposition-stranding construc-
tions to semantic and pragmatic factors (Bresnan , Takami ):
() a. Who did you write a book about?
b. Who did you destroy a book about?
There are of course limits to what we can expect text-mining of this kind to discover.
It is also important in answering such questions as ‘Is the president in Washington?’ to
understand that nothing can be in more than one place at a time, so that the question
can be answered in the negative on the basis of a text saying that ‘The president is in
Hawai’i’. This knowledge is probably too banal to be mentioned in text, ever.
However, this is not the kind of knowledge we want to put into the lexical entailments
of being there. It is the kind of nonlinguistic knowledge that we share with other animals.
(My cat seemed quite clear on the point that things could only be in one place at a time.)
It is the kind of knowledge that we hard-wire into the knowledge representation for our
robot planning systems, as in the STRIPS planner (Fikes and Nilsson ), perhaps
along lines suggested in Steedman () or van Lambalgen and Hamm (). Among
other things, such systems build in such knowledge as that, if you move something,
then you don’t change the containment relations with things that it may contain. (This
has the pleasing consequence that if my bicycle is on a train in London, and the train
goes to Edinburgh, I know that my bicycle is in Edinburgh and not in London without
ever having to invoke an axiom that things can only be in one place at a time.) A
representation of this kind is probably built in to the natural logical ‘language of mind’
that underpins language acquisition and language evolution in the same way, so it
should be built into the Reichenbachian representation proposed above, rather than
making such banal entailments explicit in the lexicon.
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. Conclusion
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
A decompositional semantics of this kind, acquired by machine-learning of latent
semantic primitives from text, builds commonsense entailments into logical form itself,
so that they can be derived directly from sentential meanings, rather than by theorem-
proving search. It can be seen as a lexicalized implementation of Carnap’s ()
‘meaning postulates’, which he proposed to make the repository of the knowledge that
someone being a bachelor entails them being male and unmarried, and which Fodor
et al. (), and J.D. Fodor (: –) advocate as a basis for lexical semantics over
the feature-based account of Katz and Postal (). Indeed, our lexicon is entirely
Fodorian, in the sense that many lexical logical forms are atomic primitives. The
difference in the present approach is that bidirectional entailments or paraphrases are
reduced to semantically primitive typed relational clusters like those in Figure .,
representing a hidden version of the features in such decompositional accounts, as in
the hybrid decompositional/meaning-postulate approach proposed by Lakoff ().
The approach can also be seen as a practical implementation of Wittgenstein’s famous
(: ¶) identification of the meaning of (content) words with usage (‘Gebrauch’):
For a large class of occasions of use of the word ‘meaning’—though not for every
occasion of its use—this word can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its usage
in the language.6
Such a usage-based semantics of content-words, if refined considerably further than it
has been so far, especially by the use of multilingual data, might ultimately approach
the hidden conceptual language to which the child must have access in order to hang
language-specific grammar onto it during first language acquisition, as required by
Fodor ().
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